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In an inﬂuential article, Alesina and Drazen (1991) model delay
of stabilization as the result of a struggle between political groups
supporting reform plans with diﬀerent distributional implications. In
this paper we show that ex ante asymmetries in the costs of delay for
the groups will reduce the probability of conﬂict and will lead to a
shorter expected delay. Accurate common information about the cost
of delay may lead to no delay at all. In an asymmetric conﬂict, a
wider divergence in the distributional implications of reform will re-
duce the probability of conﬂict but will lead to a longer expected delay.
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In their (1991) article titled “Why are stabilizations delayed?”, Alesina and
Drazen provide a model where delay of economic reforms is the result of a
distributional conﬂict between political groups uncertain about the capacity
of their rivals to bear the cost of inﬂation and other distortions caused by
delay. Although all political groups understand the need for reform, and al-
though all suﬀer while reforms are delayed, each has an incentive to resist the
adoption of reform in the hope that the others will capitulate ﬁrst and agree
to bear a disproportionate burden of the reform program. The model predicts
that reform delay will be shorter the more similar are the distributional con-
sequences of diﬀerent reform plans, and the higher is the cost of delay for all
groups. As shown by Drazen and Grilli (1993), this last result supports the
common view that ﬁnancial crises and other pains resulting from budgetary
instability have the virtue of inducing earlier expected reform. Alesina and
Drazen’s (1991) analysis has been extended elsewhere by Alesina and Perotti
(1995), Casella and Eichengreen (1996), Guidotti and Vegh (1999), Spolaore
(2003), among others, and has achieved textbook status in the presentations
by Persson and Tabellini (2000: 361-364) and Drazen (2000: 432-439).1
A key simpliﬁcation in Alesina and Drazen’s (1991) seminal contribution
and the subsequent literature is the assumption that the political groups in
conﬂict are identical ex ante, in the sense that the (privately known) cost
of inﬂation for each group is independently drawn from the same distribu-
tion. Ex ante symmetry, however, is a very strong assumption. In general,
the constituencies of rival political groups are not expected to be similarly
aﬀected by pre-stabilization distortions. For instance, inﬂation is commonly
believed to be a regressive tax.2 Thus, political groups representing on aver-
age lower income constituencies are likely to be the more aﬀected by delaying
the stabilization. Moreover, a symmetric setup precludes the consideration
of (publicly observed) changes in the cost of inﬂation for one of the groups
1While Alesina and Drazen were the ﬁrst authors to use the war of attrition model in a
macroeconomic context, they build on the biological model of Maynard Smith (1974) and
Riley (1980), and the public-good model of Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984).
2Erosa and Ventura (2000) argue this point in a monetary economy with heterogenous
household wealth composition and transaction patterns. Also, Romer and Romer (1999)
ﬁnd a negative correlation between the income of the poor and average inﬂation.
1in conﬂict. An example is the more extensive use of foreign currency by the
richer segments of the population, reducing their cost of inﬂation.3
In this paper, we consider a model of stabilization delay due to conﬂict-
ing (and possibly asymmetric) political groups. We show that a political
group more exposed to inﬂation costs will be likely to cave in immediately,
leading to immediate reform. If the expected cost of inﬂation increases for
the more exposed group, the probability of immediate reform increases and
the expected delay of stabilization is reduced. If the expected cost of inﬂa-
tion increases for the less exposed group, the eﬀects are exactly the reverse.
Thus, in contrast to the predictions from Alesina and Drazen (1991), the
eﬀect of a reduction in the cost of inﬂation, beneﬁtting mostly the less ex-
posed group, may be a shorter delay. In agreement with the predictions from
Alesina and Drazen (1991), if the distributive consequences of reform become
more unequal, a longer expected delay follows. There is a surprising twist,
though: the probability of immediate agreement also increases. Intuitively, if
the more exposed group is nearly indiﬀerent between conceding immediately
or entering the conﬂict, it will be convinced to concede immediately by the
expectation of a longer conﬂict.
In terms of expected utility, we show that increasing the expected cost
of inﬂation for the more exposed group will increase the (utilitarian) welfare
of society, while increasing the expected cost for the least exposed group
will reduce it. An increased divergence in the distributional implications of
economic reform will reduce the expected utility of both groups. In synthesis,
asymmetries in the losses due to stabilization delay will reduce the probability
of conﬂict and increase (utilitarian) social welfare, while asymmetries in the
distributional implications of reform will reduce the probability of conﬂict
but decrease (unequivocally) social welfare.
Examples for our model can be drawn from the Latin American expe-
riences with economic reform in the second half of the 1980s and ﬁrst half
of the 1990s. In that interval, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Brazil
adopted reform programs that combined balancing the ﬁscal accounts with
large-scale privatization and overhauling of trade and industrial policies. As
3Financial adaptation to inﬂation is discussed by Lab´ an and Sturzenegger (1994), who
build on another inﬂuential contribution to the political economy of reform (Fernandez
and Rodrik 1991). See also Sturzenegger (1997).
2Rodrik (1996) notes, this peculiar mix of policies was not unavoidable – in
fact, some of the policies adopted may have complicated the stabilization
eﬀort. If we think of reform delay as the result of a distributive conﬂict,
we have to conclude that in all those cases the groups favored by right-
wing policies emerged as winners of the conﬂict, and their favorite blueprint
for reform was implemented. Strikingly, the reforms were implemented by
formerly populist presidents, often belonging to parties that had shown a
penchant for interventionism in the past. In our view, this accentuates the
character of concession of the reforms.4 Rather than by worsening conditions
for everyone, reforms in Latin America may have been prompted by relative
improvements in the ability to live with inﬂation and other distortions by
the groups that eventually held the upper hand. At least from a utilitar-
ian perspective, the lesson from our model is that ﬁnancial adaptation by
some groups in society may not have been bad for reform, contrary to what
has been claimed in previous literature. Social polarization, in the sense of
strong distributional consequences of diﬀerent reform packages, may have
been bad for reform though, as previously claimed by Alesina and Drazen
(1991) and other authors. Looking at the future, our model predicts that the
inconsistent policies characterizing stabilization delay are more likely to re-
cur in countries with moderate to high – rather than extremely high – social
polarization.
Formally, our model is an asymmetric war of attrition in the spirit of
Nalebuﬀ and Riley (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986).5 We select an
equilibrium to the model following a suggestion of Nalebuﬀ and Riley. We
show that, in all equilibria but the most favorable one, a political group
would beneﬁt from committing with some arbitrarily small probability to
never give up. A commitment strategy would consist, for instance, of se-
lecting an ideologically-motivated leadership for the group. We focus on the
“commitment-proof” equilibrium obtained by allowing each group to be com-
4Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) propose a diﬀerent, but not incompatible, explanation
of the apparent paradox of populist politicians implementing right-wing reforms in terms
of their credibility.
5More recent contributions such as those of Krishna and Morgan (1997) or Bulow and
Klemperer (1999) have extended the incomplete information war of attrition model to
aﬃliated costs or multiple combatants and prizes, but have stuck to the analysis of the
symmetric case.
3mitted with a (vanishingly small) probability. In order to perform compara-
tive static exercises, we adopt a ﬂexible functional form for the distribution
of costs of the conﬂicting parties, and complement the analytical work with
computer simulations. Finally, we show that if common information about
the expected costs of inﬂation is accurate enough so that prior beliefs about
the costs have diﬀerent supports, then a nonnegligible probability of delay
will be supported only by a positive probability of commitment or by large
distributional consequences of reform.
Perraudin and Sibert (2000) and Hsieh (2000) have proposed other bar-
gaining models of reform that allow for a positive probability of immediate
agreement. They diﬀer from our approach in that they consider a ﬁnite-
horizon, one-sided incomplete information game with discrete time, with the
uninformed party holding the ability to make reform proposals. Hsieh (2000)
shows that increasing the costs of inﬂation proportionally for both parties
leads to an increased probability of immediate agreement. Perraudin and
Sibert (2000) show that increasing the cost of inﬂation only for the informed
party may increase or decrease the probability of immediate agreement. This
result is related in their case to the increased bargaining power of the unin-
formed party, for whom delay becomes a more attractive screening device.
Neither of these two papers is concerned with the eﬀects on stabilization de-
lay of asymmetries in the expected costs of inﬂation to parties representing
diﬀerent segments of the domestic population. On another related contri-
bution, Seddon Wallack (2003) has found evidence that countries with less
accurate commonly accessible information tend to delay stabilization longer.
While she attributes this result to disagreements about the expected costs
and beneﬁts of reform, we can note that in our setup better common infor-
mation is likely to lead to a shorter delay. If the support of the distribution of
costs for the two parties are diﬀerent, which is likely to occur with accurate
common information, the probability of delay may be near zero.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is de-
scribed in Section 2. Equilibrium selection is discussed in Section 3. Com-
parative statics results are presented in Section 4. Accurate information with
respect to asymmetries in costs is investigated in Section 5. Section 6 con-
cludes with remarks on the role of institutions and information in delayed
stabilizations.
42 The model
We consider a stripped-down version of the Alesina-Drazen model. At t = 0
an economy is hit by a shock reducing tax revenues. From then until the
date of stabilization, the government deﬁcit τ has to be covered by distor-
tionary taxes (a proxy for inﬂation6). There are two political groups or
parties (i = 1,2). Before stabilization, (the representative consumer of) each
party pays half of the distortionary taxes and in addition suﬀers some welfare
loss θi that is private information to the party. For stabilization to occur, one
of the two groups (which becomes the loser) has to agree to bear a fraction
α > 1/2 of the new, nondistortionary taxation while the remainder is borne
by the other group (the winner). Note that α measures the divergence be-
tween the distributional implications of the reform plans favored by the two
groups, or “degree of polarization” of society. Welfare losses disappear with
stabilization.
Ignoring gross income, which plays no role in the model, the ﬂow utility
for group i before stabilization is: UD
i = −τ/2 − θi. After stabilization, ﬂow
utility for the loser or conceding party becomes: UL
i = −ατ. Flow utility
for the winner becomes: UW
i = −(1 − α)τ. Groups are inﬁnitely lived and
discount the future according to r. The problem of each party is to maximize
its expected lifetime utility by choosing a time to concede if the other party
has not yet conceded.
We deviate from Alesina-Drazen by allowing (common) prior beliefs about
θ1 to diﬀer from those about θ2. We assume that prior beliefs are given by the
distribution functions F1 and F2, with continuous densities f1 and f2. The
densities f1 and f2 have common support [θ, ¯ θ], and are bounded from above
and away from zero from below. We also assume that ¯ θ > θ > (α−1/2)τ; that
is, even the conceding party expects to be better oﬀ after stabilization. In the
language of Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), incomplete information is “small”
in the sense that it is common knowledge that both groups are interested in
stabilizing the economy.7
Group i’s strategy is a (measurable) function Ti : [θ, ¯ θ] → [0,∞], speci-
6Monetary versions of the model are considered by Drazen and Grilli (1993) and
Guidotti and Vegh (1999).
7If either this or the boundedness assumption fail, there could be a unique solution to
the system described by Theorem 1.
5fying for each possible value of θi the time at which group i concedes if the
other group has not yet given up. If it plans to concede at time t, and its
opponent behaves according to Tj, group i’s expected lifetime utility is:
Vi(t,Tj;θi) = Pr{Tj(θj) ≥ t} ×
hR t
0 UD

















The ﬁrst term in brackets is group i’s utility if group j remains resisting
reform at time t; the second term in brackets is group i’s utility if group j
concedes at some time Tj(θj) before t.
A (Bayesian) equilibrium is a couple of strategies {T1,T2} such that, if
group 1 behaves according to T1, group 2 ﬁnds it optimal to behave according
to T2 and viceversa. It is easy to see that there are equilibria without delay,
in which either group 1 or group 2 concedes at time zero with probability one,
while the other would wait long enough before doing so to deter the former
one from deviating. The following lemma establishes some useful properties
of equilibrium strategies for equilibria with delay.8
Lemma 1 If {T1,T2} is an equilibrium with positive probability of delay,
(1.1) Ti(θi) = 0 on [mi, ¯ θ] for some mi ∈ (θ, ¯ θ],
(1.2) Ti(θi) is continuous and strictly decreasing on (˜ θi,mi] for some ˜ θi ∈
[θ, ¯ θ] such that min{˜ θ1, ˜ θ2} = θ and T(˜ θ1) = T(˜ θ2) = ¯ T for some
¯ T > 0 (possibly inﬁnite), and
(1.3) If ¯ T < ∞, Ti(θi) ≥ ¯ T on [θ, ˜ θi]. If ¯ T = ∞, ˜ θ1 = ˜ θ2 = θ.
(Proofs are contained in Appendix A.) Lemma 1 establishes that, along the
equilibrium path, groups that suﬀer more heavily from pre-stabilization dis-
tortions will concede earlier.
8Strategy functions that coincide almost everywhere are payoﬀ equivalent and are taken
to represent the same strategies, so the properties described below are satisﬁed for a
“representative” pair of functions for every strategy pair.










i (0) if t = 0.
{Φ1(t),Φ2(t)} represent the type of each group which concedes at time t > 0
along the equilibrium path, and the minimum type that concedes at time 0,
where the type is given by the private cost of living with inﬂation. Then:
Theorem 1 {T1,T2} is an equilibrium with positive probability of delay if










= Φi(t) − (α − 1/2)τ
(i,j = 1,2 and i 6= j) such that:
(2.2) θ < min{Φ1(0),Φ2(0)} ≤ ¯ θ and max{Φ1(0),Φ2(0)} = ¯ θ.
Moreover,
(2.3) ¯ T = ∞.
The RHS of equation (2.1) is the cost for group i of waiting another instant to
concede (UL
i −UD
i ). The LHS is the expected gain for i from waiting another
instant to concede, which is the product of the conditional probability that
group j concedes at time t (the term in brackets), multiplied by the gain for




i )e−r(x−t) dx). Equation (2.2) simply states that
neither group concedes at time zero with probability one and at least one of
the two groups concedes at time zero with probability zero. Equation (2.3)
says that groups with smaller losses from inﬂation will wait nearly forever
before conceding.
Since f1 and f2 are bounded from below, the system of ordinary diﬀer-
ential equations (2.1) is Lipschitz continuous and therefore it has a unique
solution for each boundary condition deﬁned by (2.2). That is, there are
many possible equilibria with delay. Fixing, say, Φ1(0) = ¯ θ, equilibria are in-
dexed by Φ2(0) ∈ (θ, ¯ θ]. Worse, all equilibria with delay are Bayesian perfect,
since concession can occur at any moment in time, and concession eﬀectively
7ﬁnishes the game anyway. There are also equilibria without delay that are
Bayesian perfect; an example is T(θ1) = ∞ for all θ1 and T(θ2) = 0 for all
θ2 (or the opposite). An equilibrium like this is sustained by the following
out-of-equilibrium beliefs: If group 2 has not conceded before any time t > 0,
it will concede with probability one at t.
In the symmetric scenario analyzed by Alesina-Drazen, selecting the sym-
metric equilibrium implicitly uses the boundary condition Φ1(0) = Φ2(0) = ¯ θ.
In the symmetric equilibrium it is indeed the case that either increasing α
or reducing the costs of living with inﬂation proportionally for both groups
leads to an earlier stabilization. In the next section we propose an equilib-
rium selection criterion, inspired by Nalebuﬀ and Riley (1985), that allows
us to deal with the general case.
3 A commitment-proof equilibrium
In this section, we show that one of the two groups would beneﬁt considerably
from convincing the other that it is committed to never give in with some
arbitrarily small probability. Commitment, or at least the threat of it, can be
achieved by selecting ideologically motivated leaders or by adopting inﬂexible
collective decision procedures.910 In some reform episodes of the 1980s and
1990s in Latin America, a semblance of commitment to reform packages
was achieved through the apparent delegation of economic policymaking to
“technocrats” or even to multilateral lending organizations.
We proceed by “perturbing” the model with the introduction of some
probability pi that each group is “irrationally” committed to never give in,
where pi ∈ [0,1], p1 + p2 > 0, and  is taken to be arbitrarily small. As
before, the distribution of the cost of inﬂation for a “rational” group is given
by Fi. Let Gi(x) = (1 − pi)Fi(x) + pi and gi(x) = (1 − pi)fi(x). Let also
Ki ≡ (θ − (α − 1/2)τ)ln(pj/pi) +
R ¯ θ
θ ln(Gj(x)/Gi(x))dx.
9“Many of the attributes of rationality [...] are strategic liabilities in certain conﬂict
situations. It may be perfectly rational to wish oneself not altogether rational, or [...]
to wish for the power to suspend certain rational capabilities in particular situations”
(Schelling 1960).
10Sargent’s (1986) lively discussion on credibility and Reaganomics illustrates the im-
portance, and the costs, of convincing the other of one’s stubbornness.
8Then:
Theorem 2 In the perturbed model, if pi = 0, then in equilibrium group
i concedes at time zero with probability one. If p1,p2 > 0, the (unique)
equilibrium is characterized by an analogue to equation (2.1), with Fi and fi
replaced by Gi and gi, and the following boundary condition: if Ki ≤ 0, then
Φi(0) = ¯ θ; otherwise Φi(0) is given by
R ¯ θ
Φi(0)(gi(x)/Gi(x))(x − (α − 1/2)τ)dx = Ki.
By committing unilaterally to never concede, even with an arbitrarily
small probability, a group is able to extract an immediate concession from
the other group. If both groups are able to convince the other that they
are “irrationally” committed to never give up with some positive probability,
then we obtain a unique equilibrium that is similar to those described by
Theorem 1. (That is, there are no equilibria without delay if p1,p2 > 0.)
Now by letting  go to zero for p1 = p2 > 0, we can in fact select a unique
equilibrium in the unperturbed model. We refer to this as the commitment-
proof equilibrium.11







Thus, in the commitment-proof equilibrium,
Φi(0) < ¯ θ if and only if
R ¯ θ
θ ln(Fj(x)/Fi(x))dx > 0;
in this case Φi(0) is given by
R ¯ θ
Φi(0)(fi(x)/Fi(x))(x − (α − 1/2)τ)dx =
R ¯ θ
θ ln(Fj(x)/Fi(x))dx.
It follows that one party will concede at time zero with positive probabil-
ity, unless pre-stabilization welfare losses are “very close” in stochastic terms
for the two groups, in the sense that
R ¯ θ
θ ln(F1(x)/F2(x))dx = 0. Moreover,
11Note that a unique selection can be made even if p1 6= p2 is a more appropriate
assumption; the boundary condition used to select an equilibrium changes continuously
with p1/p2.
9if pre-stabilization welfare losses of one party exhibit ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance over the losses of the other, then the former party concedes at
time zero with positive probability.
Inspecting the conditions satisﬁed by the commitment-proof equilibrium,
we can see that, ceteris paribus, an outward shift of both distributions of
losses to ˜ F1, ˜ F2 with ˜ F1(θ1 − κ) = F1(θ1) and ˜ F2(θ2 − κ) = F2(θ2) for some
κ > 0, leads to an increase in mini Φi(0) (as long as mini Φi(0) < θ). That is,
if inﬂation becomes proportionally more painful for both parties, the prob-
ability of immediate reform increases. Finally, and rather surprisingly, if α
increases, Φi(0) should decrease (as long as mini Φi(0) < θ). That is, wider
distributional implications of reform increase the probability of immediate
reform.
This last result can be related to the increased “willingness to ﬁght” of
the party that does not concede at time 0 convincing the marginal type or
types of the other party that it is not worth entering the conﬂict. This
argument suggests that, if α increases, the expected time of stabilization
may be delayed nonetheless due to the increased willingness to ﬁght of the
types of both parties that do enter the conﬂict. We explore this and other
comparative static exercises on the timing of stabilization in the context of
a speciﬁc functional form in the next section.
4 Comparative statics
We consider the family of linear densities with support [θ, ¯ θ] = [1,2]. Thus:
fi(θi) = 2λi(θi − 1) + 1 − λi,
with −1 < λi < 1. Note that λi = 0 corresponds to the uniform density,
and λ1 < λ2 implies that the losses of party 2 exhibits ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance over the losses of party 1. We normalize τ to one; this is equivalent
to assuming that, if reform plans are very unequal (α close to one), a party
with the lowest possible losses from inﬂation will gain almost nothing from
conceding, while a party with the highest possible losses will cut its losses by
more than half by conceding. Finally, we set r = 0.04.
Using Theorem 1 and the boundary condition derived in Section 3, we
10have that, if λ1 ≤ λ2,
(3.1) −

2γj(Φj(t) − 1) + 1




j(t) = Φi(t)−α +1/2






2γ2(x − 1) + 1
γ2(x − 1)2 + (x − 1)







γ2(x − 1) + 1
γ1(x − 1) + 1

dx.
Using Φ2(0), we can calculate the probability of immediate agreement as
Pr{T2(θ2) = 0} = 1 − F2(Φ2(0)) = 1 − λ2(Φ2(0) − 1)
2 − (1 − λ2)(Φ2(0) − 1).
We use the system of diﬀerential equations given by (3.1) and the implicit
boundary condition (3.2) to estimate also the expected time of stabilization
and the expected welfare of both parties under a variety of scenarios (see
Appendix B for a description of numerical methods).
Tables 1.1 to 1.3 report the results for the probability of immediate agree-
ment and the expected time of stabilization. Given our assumption on r, we
can interpret the unit of time as a year. Thus, the expected delay of stabi-
lization goes from 191
2 months (Table 3.1, bottom left) to 7 years (Table 3.3,
bottom right), while the probability of immediate agreement goes from 0 to
29%. In each table, the diagonal represents the case of ex ante symmetry
between the two parties, with expected losses from inﬂation increasing as
we go down or right. If the expected losses increase for party 2 (the party
already disadvantaged in terms of expected losses), then the expected delay
of stabilization is reduced and the probability of an immediate agreement
increases. The opposite happens if the expected losses increase for party 1.
Increasing the expected losses from inﬂation to both parties over the diagonal
leads to an earlier expected stabilization. Out of the diagonal, there is no
clear cut result. Finally, holding ﬁxed the expected losses for both parties
but increasing the degree of polarization α leads to an increase in the prob-
ability of an immediate agreement (outside of the diagonal) but to a longer
expected delay. This provides support to the intuitive argument at the end
of the previous section.
11Table 1.1: Probability of immediate agreement
and expected time of stabilization (α = 5/8)
































































Table 1.2: Probability of immediate agreement
and expected time of stabilization (α = 6/8)
































































12Table 1.3: Probability of immediate agreement
and expected time of stabilization (α = 7/8)
































































Tables 2.1 to 2.3 provide estimations of the expected costs of the conﬂict
for parties 1 and 2. From our assumptions, the sum of expected welfare of
party 1 and party 2 would be maximized if there were an immediate agree-
ment at time 0. Thus, the maximum possible total welfare is −τ/r = −25,
representing the purely economic cost of ﬁnancing the government deﬁcit.
Letting EVi be the expected welfare of party i, we compute the political cost
of conﬂict for party i as
100(|EVi|/25 − 1/2).
This represents the expected loss of welfare to party i of entering into the
conﬂict instead of splitting in half the economic cost of the government deﬁcit,
expressed as a percentage of the economic cost of the deﬁcit. From the
individual rationality constraint:
EVi ≥ −ατ/r = −25α,
guaranteeing that a party will not be better oﬀ by surrendering at time 0
rather than entering the conﬂict, we can obtain an upper bound of 100(2α−1)
13for the total expected political cost as a percentage of the economic cost.
Thus, in Table 2.1 the upper bound for the total political cost is 25% of the
economic cost, in Table 2.2 it is 50%, and in Table 2.3 it is 75%. The total
political cost in our estimations goes from 16.53% (Table 2.1, bottom left)
to 66.42% (Table 2.3, bottom right).
Looking at each table from 2.1 to 2.3, we can see that increasing the
inﬂation losses for both parties increase the total political cost along the
diagonal. That is, the fact that inﬂation lasts less time does not compensate
the fact that it is more painful.12 Outside the diagonal, the total political
cost may increase or decrease, but it generally decreases when inﬂation losses
increase for both parties. When inﬂation losses increase only for party 2, the
total expected political cost is reduced, while the opposite happens when
inﬂation losses increase only for party 1. Finally, increasing α while holding
inﬂation losses constant always makes both parties worse oﬀ.
Table 2.1: Expected political costs
for party 1 and party 2 (α = 5/8)
































































12Simulations by Drazen and Grilli (1993) have found that for low levels of inﬂation
costs the reverse may be true.
14Table 2.2: Expected political costs
for party 1 and party 2 (α = 6/8)
































































Table 2.3: Expected political costs
for party 1 and party 2 (α = 7/8)

































































In this section, we consider a situation is which it is common knowledge that
the lowest possible cost inﬂation for one party is larger than for the other,
even if the cost of inﬂation is private information. We interpret this situation
as reﬂecting very accurate common information in relation to the size of the
asymmetries in inﬂation costs.
Formally, we modify the model so that now the support of the distribution
of θi is [θi, ¯ θi] for i = 1,2, and
θ2 > θ1 > (α − 1/2)τ.
We can imagine that party 2 represents the poor, and that it is believed
that in the best possible scenario for both rich and poor, the poor cannot be
better protected from inﬂation than the rich.
In this version of the model, we still have equilibria without delay and
(many) equilibria with positive probability of delay. Equilibria with delay
are characterized by equation (2.1) and an analogue of equation (2.2):
θi < Φi(0) ≤ ¯ θi for i = 1,2, and Φ1(0) = ¯ θ1 or Φ2(0) = ¯ θ2 (or both).
Perturbing this model, as in Section 3, we obtain a result similar to
Theorem 2, except that now Φi(0) < ¯ θ if and only if





θi lnGi(x)dx > 0.
Letting  go to zero for p1,p2 > 0, we get that K2 goes to −∞. That is,
in the unique equilibrium of the perturbed model, party 2 concedes at time
zero with probability arbitrarily close to one as  go to zero. It follows that,
in the commitment-proof equilibrium, party 2 concedes at time zero with
probability one. Accurate information leads to no delay at all!
If the probability of commitment is not zero, there will be some probabil-
ity of delay. This is perhaps a more satisfying assumption to the extent that
then the probability of delay changes continuously with the support of the
prior beliefs. A positive probability of delay will also result if the distribu-
tive consequences of reform are so dire that (α − 1/2)τ > θ2 > θ1, so that
16with some probability both parties will be unwilling to give up. In that case,
from the work of Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), we know that the equilibrium
will be unique and will generally involve a positive probability of immediate
concession.
6 Final remarks
We argue in this paper that asymmetries in the losses occasioned by pre-
stabilization distortions to diﬀerent political groups may lead to a sooner end
of episodes of delayed stabilization. A number of economic reform episodes
in Latin America in the last two decades seem to ﬁt this pattern. In terms
of understanding those episodes, the model points to the need of collecting
evidence on the distribution of the cost of pre-stabilization distortions in
those cases. We also argue that social polarization, in the sense of wider
distributional implications of the available reform plans, makes conﬂicts over
stabilization less likely, but contributes to a longer delay if a conﬂict breaks
up.
From a broader perspective, our paper, as well as related literature stem-
ming from Alesina-Drazen (1991), emphasizes the role in stabilization delay
of the absence or weakness of institutions of conﬂict management that al-
low ﬁscal shocks to develop into distributional conﬂicts. Recent contribu-
tions by Rodrik (1999) and by Acemoglu et al. (2003) show that in fact
weak institutions account for a large fraction of the macroeconomic volatil-
ity and dismal growth performance of many countries in Latin America and
elsewhere. The wave of economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s does not
seem to have done much in terms of strengthening institutions for conﬂict
management. Consistent with the “seesaw hypothesis” of Acemoglu et al.
(2003), market-oriented reforms were often accompanied by new ways to en-
gage into traditional predatory and redistributive activities.13 Thus, ﬁscal
shocks occasioned by external circumstances may in the future trigger again
the inconsistent policies that characterized the delayed stabilizations of the
past.
13In the case of Peru in the 1990s, for instance, Bowen and Hollinger (2003) provide
some examples of creative use of the judicial system and the tax agency for extortion,
predation and redistribution.
17A particular obstacle for conﬂict management emphasized in this paper
is the absence of accurate information regarding the costs of delayed reform.
This paper, as a large part of the political economy literature, is silent on
how the relevant agents acquire and aggregate information. Incorporating
adequate microfoundations with respect to information acquisition and ag-
gregation in this and other political economy models is a challenge for future
research.
18Appendix A: Proofs
A rigorous demonstration for most of the content of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1
is provided by Fudenberg and Tirole (1986); here the proof is only sketched.
The proof of Theorem 2 follows Nalebuﬀ and Riley (1985).
Proof of Lemma 1:
If there is positive probability of delay, there is some ¯ T > 0 (possibly inﬁ-
nite) such that for every t < ¯ T there is some positive probability that neither
party has conceded, and the probability that neither party has conceded at or
before ¯ T is zero. Ti is nonincreasing for the set of types such that Ti(θi) < ¯ T,
and this set must be some interval (˜ θi, ¯ θ], because increasing θi decreases the
payoﬀ to keep ﬁghting but does not change the payoﬀ to conceding. Ti must
also be gapless on [0, ¯ T): If there is a gap [β0,β) ⊂ [0, ¯ T) in Ti (that is, an
interval over which group i concedes with probability zero), then there must
be a gap (β0,β) in Tj because for any θj it would be preferable to concede
at time β0 than at (β0,β). But then any type of group i planning to concede
at or near β would be better oﬀ conceding at time (β0 + β)/2. Furthermore,
Ti must be atomless on (0, ¯ T): If there is some nonnegligible probability of
group i conceding at time 0 < η < ¯ T (a mass of types θi conceding at time
η), then there will be some interval (η−,η) such that in that interval group
j will prefer to wait for the discontinuous jump in the probability of group i
conceding. But this would create a gap on (0, ¯ T). By the same reasoning, if
¯ T is ﬁnite, Ti must be atomless on (0, ¯ T].
The previous discussion establishes that Ti is continuous and strictly de-
creasing on (˜ θi,mi], where mi is the lowest type that concedes at time 0.
Moreover, if ¯ T is ﬁnite, it follows that at least one party concedes before ¯ T
with probability one, so min{˜ θ1, ˜ θ2} = θ, and if one party does not concede
with probability one before ¯ T, then T(θi) ≥ ¯ T on [θ, ˜ θi]. If ¯ T is inﬁnite, then
˜ θ1 = ˜ θ2 = θ because otherwise at least one party would concede at ∞ with
positive probability. But then the probability of concession by this party
after t would get arbitrarily close to zero as t increases, and there would be
some time t0 such that the other party would prefer to concede for any pre-
stabilization welfare loss smaller than or equal to θ rather than keep resisting
nearly forever.
19Proof of Theorem 1:
We prove necessity; the proof of suﬃciency is straightforward. From the
properties of Ti given by Lemma 1 it follows that its inverse Φi is continu-
ous and strictly increasing. Everywhere diﬀerentiability can be established
following Lemma 1(iv) in Fudenberg and Tirole (1986). Equation (2.1) then
follows from diﬀerentiating Vi(t,Tj;θi) with respect to t and making the
derivative equal to zero at Ti(θi) = t (or Φi(t) = θi). Where this deriva-
tive positive, group i would prefer to wait longer to concede, while were it
negative, group i would prefer to concede before Ti(θi).
Equation (2.2) is proved by contradiction. If both groups were conceding
at time 0 with positive probability, any group would be better oﬀ by waiting
inﬁnitesimally to see if its rival concedes immediately. If any group were
conceding at time 0 with probability one, there would not be a positive
probability of delay.
To show that the system of ordinary diﬀerential equations given by (2.1)
has a (unique) solution for each boundary condition satisfying (2.2), note that
the mapping φ : (θ, ¯ θ)2 → <2 from Φ = (Φ1,Φ2) to ˙ Φ = ( ˙ Φ1, ˙ Φ2) (the time
derivatives) given by (2.1) is Lipschitz continuous. Thus, it has a unique
solution through every Φ ∈ (θ, ¯ θ)2; that is, a function ξ(·,Φ) : J → <2
where J is an open interval containing t = 0 such that ξ(0,Φ) = Φ and
Dtξ(t,Φ) = φ(ξ(t,Φ)). Moreover, the solution is continuous in t and Φ (see
e.g. Hirsch and Smale 1974). Since f1,f2 are bounded, we can easily extend
the dominion of φ to include the endpoint ¯ θ, so we have a unique solution for
every Φ satisfying (2.2). Finally, since ˙ Φi < 0 for Φi ∈ (θ, ¯ θ] and Φj ∈ [θ, ¯ θ],
with limΦi↓θ ˙ Φi = 0, and every solution must lie in the compact set [θ, ¯ θ]2,
then ξ(t,Φ) is deﬁned for all t ≥ 0, and in fact as t goes to ∞, ξ(t,Φ) goes
to the point (θ,θ). That is, in equilibrium the last time of concession is the
same for both parties and is inﬁnite.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Note ﬁrst that, if pi > 0, there is no equilibrium in which party i concedes
at time 0 with probability one (conditional on party i being rational). In
any such equilibria, party j would be persuaded that party i is irrational if
concession does not occur at time 0, and then, conditional on being rational,
20it would concede with probability one after some arbitrarily small interval.14
But then party i would have an incentive to wait until rational types of party
j concede. Thus, in the perturbed model, if p1,p2 > 0, there are no equilibria
in which either type, conditional on being rational, concedes at time zero.
Moreover, if pi = 0 and pj > 0, there is still an equilibrium without delay in
which party i concedes at time zero with probability one and party j never
concedes.
To investigate equilibria with delay, using arguments similar to those of
Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, we obtain an expression similar to equation (2.1),











Changing variables and integrating in θj, we obtain a condition on the last



















θ − (α − 1/2)τ
dx = −ln(pi) ×
2(α − 1/2)τr−1
θ − (α − 1/2)τ
.
That is, if pi > 0, Tj(¯ θ) < ∞. Now, Tj(θ) = Ti(θ), because if group i will not
concede after some ﬁnite time, then group j has nothing to gain by waiting















This implicitly deﬁnes a ﬁrst order diﬀerential equation for θ2 as a function




(gi(x)/Gi(x))(x − (α − 1/2)τ)dx,
14Strictly speaking, there is no best response for party j which is enough to prove
nonexistence of equilibrium.
21where σi is some ﬁxed real number in (θ, ¯ θ). Using the deﬁnition of H and
the previous equation, we obtain a mapping from the type of group 1 that
concedes at a given time to the type of group 2 that concedes at the same
time:
H2(θ2) = H1(θ1) + c.
where c is an integration constant. Since the last concession time is the same
for both groups, we have c = H2(θ) − H1(θ). Thus
(A.3) H2(Φ2(0)) − H2(¯ θ) = H1(Φ1(0)) − H1(¯ θ) + M,
where M ≡ H1(¯ θ)−H1(θ)−H2(¯ θ)+H2(θ). A condition similar to (2.2) still
holds in the perturbed model. It follows that Φ2(0) < ¯ θ and Φ1(0) = ¯ θ if and
only if M > 0, and Φ1(0) < ¯ θ and Φ2(0) = ¯ θ if and only if M < 0.
To ﬁnd M, integrating by parts in (A.2) we get:
Hi(θi) =








Thus, if p1,p2 > 0,
(A.4) M = (θ − (α − 1/2)τ)ln(p1/p2) +
R ¯ θ
θ ln(G1(x)/G2(x))dx.




(g2(x)/G2(x))(x − (α − 1/2)τ)dx = M,
and we can compute Φ1(0) similarly if M < 0. (Note that the integral in the
LHS is strictly decreasing in Φ2(0), and that it grows without bound as Φ2(0)
approaches θ, which guarantees existence and uniqueness.) Finally, if p1 > 0
and p2 = 0, M = ∞ and then there is no solution to (A.3) for Φ2(0) > θ;
that is, there is no equilibrium with delay. Similarly, if p1 = 0 and p2 > 0,
M = −∞ and an equivalent argument holds.
Proof of claims in Section 5:
The claims in Section 5 can be veriﬁed by following the steps of the proofs
of Theorems 1 and 2, substituting θi for θ and ¯ θi for ¯ θ where appropriate,
22except that now equation (A.4) is replaced by






Appendix B: Numerical methods
In order to solve the system given by (3.1) and (3.2) we employ the fourth-
order Runge-Kutta method (see e.g. Robertson 1991). Here the step size






φj (t) − α + 1
2
 
(1 − φi (t)) − γi (1 − φi (t))
2
(2γi (φi (t) − 1) + 1)(50α − 25)
≡ ψi (t,φi,φj),
for i = 1,2, j 6= i, allows us to implement the method in the following way:























µik4 = hψi (tk + h,φik + µik3,φjk + µjk3),
with φ10 = 2 and φ20 given implicitly by (3.2). With this data we can
approximate the expected time of stabilization and the expected welfare of
both parties.
Expected time of stabilization
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Group i’s expected welfare is
Ei [Vi (t,Tj (·);θi)]
=
R θ
θ Vi (t,Tj (·);θi)dFi (θi)
=
nR θ
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We can approximate the expected welfare as
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